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DOUBLE TROUBLE FOR LOGICAL PLURALISTS
J.W EVERSHED
According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to
many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one cor-
rect logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of
thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative
for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of
beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which
we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for
reasoning, a wide array of logical pluralisms are inconsistent with the
normativity of logic as they entail contradictory claims about how
agents ought to reason. Thus, if logic is normative for reasoning, these
pluralisms are untenable.
I
Introduction. A time-honoured view has it that logic is normative
for reasoning. A more recent view, logical pluralism, has it that there
is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between
these two views? In a bid to help answer this question, this paper
advances two theses. First, the Double Thesis: logic is doubly norma-
tive for reasoning because, as well as constraining the combinations
of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by
which we may form them. Second, the Inconsistency Thesis: given
that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, many pluralisms—in-
cluding those defended by Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009a),
and Varzi (2002)—are inconsistent with the normativity of logic, as
they entail logically contradictory claims about how agents ought to
reason. Accordingly, if logic is normative for reasoning as I suggest,
these pluralisms are untenable.
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II
The Double Thesis. Orthodoxy has it that logic is normative for rea-
soning. In this slogan, the term ‘logic’ refers to correct logics1—after
all, incorrect logics do not tell us how we ought to reason—and ‘rea-
soning’ to the process of forming and revising our doxastic attitudes
via inference (Harman 1986, pp. 1–2). This section argues for the
Double Thesis: logic is doubly normative for reasoning because it
constrains the combinations of beliefs that we may have and the
methods by which we may form them. As we shall see, the novelty
of this proposal resides in the fact that the former aspect of logic’s
normativity has been discussed extensively whereas the latter has
gone unnoticed.
To illustrate that logic is doubly normative, we begin with two
examples of reasoning gone awry:
Suky. Suky truly believes both that there is a cat on the mat and that there
is a dog on the log, but refuses to take a stance on their conjunction.
Max. Max is curious about how Aeschylus died. He reasons: if an ea-
gle dropped a tortoise on Aeschylus’s head, then Aeschylus is dead;
Aeschylus is dead, so an eagle dropped a tortoise on his head.
Both Suky and Max make logical errors, albeit of different kinds.
Suky’s reasoning is problematic because of the combination of
beliefs she has. The problem is that she believes two conjuncts but
refuses to take a stance on the conjunction which they straightfor-
wardly entail. Moreover, this is erroneous regardless of how she
formed these beliefs. By contrast, Max’s fault lies not in his combina-
tion of beliefs—indeed, they are all true—and therefore his error is
of a different kind to Suky’s. Rather, his mistake resides in the
method by which he formed his belief, namely, via the invalid infer-
ence of affirming the consequent .
These two kinds of errors indicate that logic is doubly normative
for reasoning: it constrains both the combinations of beliefs that
agents may have and the methods by which they may form them.
However, we cannot immediately conclude from these cases that the
Double Thesis is true. Ever since Harman (1986) showed us that
1 Loosely speaking, a logic, Li, is correct just in case a natural language argument is valid in
the extra-systemic sense of ‘valid’ if and only if its counterpart in Li’s formal language is Li-
valid (Haack 1978, pp. 221–2).
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logical facts and normative constraints on reasoning are not identi-
cal, if logic is to be normative for reasoning in either way there must
be true bridge principles . Bridge principles are conditionals whose
antecedents are logical facts and whose consequents are the norma-
tive constraints on reasoning that these facts induce (MacFarlane
ms). Accordingly, logic is normative for belief combinations and
methods just in case there are separate bridge principles linking logi-
cal facts to constraints on belief combinations and to constraints on
methods of belief formation. The remainder of this section estab-
lishes the Double Thesis by articulating bridge principles of both
kinds.
We begin with the bridge principles capturing the normativity of
logic for belief combinations. As illustrated by Suky’s case, con-
straints on belief combinations are induced by validity facts of the
form form C Liu, where Li is a correct logic. Let us call the bridge
principles relating validity facts to these constraints validity bridge
principles. The existing literature on the normativity of logic has fo-
cused exclusively on whether there are any true validity bridge prin-
ciples, and this remains a matter of great controversy (see, for
instance, Harman 1986; Streumer 2007; Milne 2009; Field 2009b;
Pinder 2017; Steinberger 2019a, 2019b; MacFarlane ms). Happily,
we can circumvent this issue. §iii aims to show that many pluralisms
are inconsistent with the normativity of logic, as they entail contra-
dictions when two of the pluralist’s logics conflict over an argu-
ment’s validity. Since these conflicts can arise for arguments whose
conclusions are both easily deducible from their premisses—such as
basic disjunctive syllogisms and double-negation eliminations—and
of interest to the agent, we only need a validity bridge principle that
holds in these ‘simple’ cases, such as:
ðVBPLiÞ If C Liu, then s ought to (if s believes C, then s believes u).2
Thus when it comes to simple arguments whose conclusions are
of interest to the agent, ðVBPLiÞ states that if the argument is valid
according to a correct logic, then s ought to see to it that if they be-
lieve the premisses, then they believe the conclusion.
2 Since (VBPLi), is restricted to simple cases, it can be understood as an evaluative, directive,
or appraisal norm in Steinberger’s (2019a) sense.
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Whilst ðVBPLiÞ has a number of attractive features, two are par-
ticularly salient: it satisfies MacFarlane’s (ms, p. 12) strictness and
obtuseness criteria.3 By employing the indefeasible ‘ought to’ opera-
tor, ðVBPLiÞ captures the fact that in simple cases our logical obliga-
tions are strict. Irrespective of her reasons for doing so, Suky’s
reasoning is erroneous if she believes both conjuncts whilst refusing
to take a stance on their conjunction. By positively requiring agents
to believe the logical consequences of their belief sets (or else revise
them)—rather than merely forbidding agents from disbelieving said
consequences—ðVBPLiÞ captures the fact that it is logically wrong
to be obtuse and, as Suky does, believe both conjuncts whilst refus-
ing to take a stance on their conjunction.
We now turn to bridge principles which capture the normativity
of logic for methods of belief formation. Since Max’s mistake is that
he reasons invalidly, the constraint that he violates is induced by an
invalidity fact of the form C 6Li w. Let us call the corresponding
bridge principles invalidity bridge principles.4
What might an invalidity bridge principle look like? In so far as
the existing literature has been exclusively preoccupied with bridge
principles concerning constraints on belief combinations, the prevail-
ing conception of the normativity of logic neglects its normativity for
methods of belief formation. Thus we are now entering unchartered
waters; but the basic idea is that if an argument is invalid according
to a correct logic, then agents are forbidden from forming the belief
that w via deduction from C:
ðIBPLiÞ If C 6Li w, then s is forbidden from forming the belief that
via that w via deduction from C.
A couple of points are in order. First, deduction as a method of
belief formation must be individuated fallibly, so that forming beliefs
via invalid deductive inferences may qualify as tokens of deduction.
This is because if deduction were individuated infallibly, and only
forming beliefs via valid inferences qualified as tokens of deduction,
ðIBPLiÞ would be vacuous, as it would forbid agents from doing the
3 Restricting (VBPLi), to simple cases dispels concerns about over-demandingness, clutter,
and paradoxes.
4 I have explored invalidity bridge principles in greater detail elsewhere—see Evershed
(2021).
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impossible: validly deducing w from C. Since fallibilist method indi-
viduation is a mainstream position in contemporary epistemology
(see, for instance, Goldman 1979, 1986; Nozick 1981; Sosa 1991;
Brown 2018) and there are strong independent arguments in its fa-
vour, I take this to be unproblematic.5
Second, (IBP) has some attractive features which further motivate
it. Uncontroversially, that the sun has risen every previous morning
does not entail that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Although
this invalidity fact induces a constraint that forbids agents from be-
lieving the latter via deduction from the former, it does not induce a
constraint that forbids agents from forming this belief via induction
from the same premiss. ðIBPLiÞ can accommodate this, as any fallibi-
list individuation of deduction used in epistemology will not count
inductive inferences as tokens of deduction. With ðVBPLiÞ and
ðIBPLiÞ in place, we turn to the Inconsistency Thesis.
III
The Inconsistency Thesis. According to the Inconsistency Thesis,
given that logic is doubly normative, many pluralisms are inconsis-
tent with the normativity of logic. Roughly, the normative contradic-
tion argument for this thesis is that many pluralisms entail contradic-
tory claims about how agents ought to reason when two of their
correct logics disagree over an argument’s validity.
The main obstacle to establishing the Inconsistency Thesis by teas-
ing out a contradiction from ðVBPLiÞ, ðIBPLiÞ and pluralism is that
the consequents of ðVBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ are not contradictories.
Whilst the former says that one is required to have a certain combi-
nation of beliefs, the latter says that one cannot form beliefs via cer-
tain methods. To jump this hurdle, we require a principle that
somehow links the fact that one ought to have a belief to its being
permissible to form it via deduction. Principles delineating how
oughts transmit from ends to the means by which they can be ac-
complished—instrumental transmission principles—are familiar
5 Sosa (1991, ch. 13) and Brown (2018, pp. 114–19) reject individuating deduction infalli-
bly because doing so divorces deduction’s reliability from agents’ propensity to reason val-
idly and is incompatible with the widely accepted phenomenon of epistemic defeat, where
beliefs lose an epistemic status such as justification.
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from the literature on instrumental rationality (for an overview, see
Kolodny 2018). The following principle fits the bill:
Transmission. If s ought to believe u and m is a reliable6 method
by which s can form the belief that u, then s is permitted to form
the belief that u via m.
Besides its intuitive plausibility, Transmission satisfies two key desid-
erata. First, the means that it permits one to employ increase the prob-
ability of accomplishing the end since employing a reliable method to
form a belief is sufficient for doing so (Kolodny 2018, pp. 734–7).
Second, employing a reliable method like deduction to form a new be-
lief is not superfluous, in the sense that part of the permitted means
alone is sufficient to form the belief (Kolodny 2018, pp. 747–50).
With Transmission to hand, we may articulate the normative con-
tradiction argument in the following two steps. First, take a simple
argument from C to u, like a disjunctive syllogism, whose premisses
s ought to believe. If this argument is Li-valid—that is, if C Liu—
then, by ðVBPLiÞ, it follows that s ought to believe u. Given that Li is
correct and supposing s is an adept reasoner, forming the belief that
u via Li-valid deduction from C is a reliable method for s. In con-
junction with Transmission, this entails that it is permissible for s to
form the belief that u via deduction from C. That is, for an adept
reasoner who ought to believe C, the following methods-oriented va-
lidity bridge principle holds:
ðm VBPLiÞ If C Liu, then s is permitted to form the belief that
u via deduction from C.7
Second, suppose that logics L1 and L2 are correct and that the argu-




-invalid. Since C Liu, it follows
from ðm VBPL1Þ that s is permitted to form the belief that u via
deduction from C. However, since L2 is also correct and C 6L2 u, it
follows from ðIBPL2Þ that s is forbidden from forming the belief that
u via deduction from C. Contradiction. So both L1 and L2 cannot be
correct. Accordingly, given that logics are doubly normative for rea-
soning, whenever two of the pluralist’s logics conflict over the
6 By ‘reliable’, I mean reliably truth-tracking.
7 Some might find (m # VBPLi) plausible independently of the fact that it can be derived
from (VBPLi) and Transmission. This strengthens the normative contradiction argument, as
it means it can proceed even if one finds (VBPLi) or Transmission problematic.
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validity of an argument whose conclusion is easily deducible from
premisses that the agent ought to believe, contradiction ensues.
Hence the Inconsistency Thesis.
Which pluralisms are vulnerable? To get off the ground, the nor-
mative contradiction argument relies on there being an argument to
which both L1 and L2 can be correctly applied and whose validity
they conflict over. And although not all pluralisms allow for the exis-
tence of such an argument, many do and are therefore vulnerable.
To see why, following Shapiro (2014, pp. 8–9) we can think of dif-
ferent pluralisms as relativising logics to different parameters, such
as the cases that the consequence relation quantifies over or domains
of inquiry. For a given pluralism, different logics are correct depend-
ing on what value this parameter takes, which in turn varies with the
features of the argument in question. Consequently, although L
1
and
L2 may conflict over an argument’s validity, if only one of them
applies to this argument then no contradiction arises. For instance,
on Lynch’s (2009) domain-relative pluralism, different logics are
correct relative to different domains of inquiry, with classical logic
correct in the mind-independent realm but intuitionistic logic correct
in the mind-dependent realm. Although these logics conflict over the
validity of double-negation elimination concerning mind-dependent
entities, only intuitionistic logic applies to this argument, and so no
contradiction arises. Whilst Lynch’s domain-relative pluralism may
not allow multiple logics to apply to an argument whose validity
they disagree over, it is very much the exception rather than the rule.
Here we sample three prominent pluralisms.8
Beall and Restall’s Case-Relative Pluralism. Beall and Restall
(2006) claim that the core of our concept of validity is given by the
Generalised Tarski Thesis (gtt):
GTT. ‘An argument is validx if and only if, in every casex in which
the premisses are true, so is the conclusion’ (Beall and Restall
2006, p. 29).
Different logics are correct relative to the cases that gtt quantifies
over: classical logic when they are Tarskian models, intuitionistic
8 Other pluralists include Blake-Turner and Russell (2018), Bueno and Shalkowski (2009),
Haack (1978), Kouri Kissel (2018), Russell (2008), and Shapiro (2014). I am inclined to
think that these pluralisms are also vulnerable to the normative contradiction argument,
but showing this lies beyond the scope of the present work.
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logic when they are constructions, and a relevant logic when they
are situations. Crucially, Beall and Restall endorse the formality of
logic (2006, pp. 18–23)—that is, the logics they endorse are correct
across all domains of inquiry—and they ‘do not take logical conse-
quence to be relative to languages, communities of inquiry, contexts,
or anything else’ (2006, p. 88). Accordingly, for any given argument,
cases can be models, constructions, or situations, and so any of these
conflicting logics can be applied to any argument, which is all that
the normative contradiction argument requires.
Varzi’s Distinction-Relative Pluralism. On Varzi’s (2002) plural-
ism, different logics are correct relative to where the distinction be-
tween a language’s logical and non-logical terms is drawn. Thus a
propositional logic is correct when only the standard connectives are
logical terms, but a first-order logic is correct when the quantifiers
are added. Given that ‘all (or any) terms of the language could in
principle be regarded “as logical”’ (2002, p. 200), for any given ar-
gument the logical–non-logical distinction can be drawn such that
any combination of its terms are logical, relative to which different
conflicting logics are correct. Consider the argument, ‘Guinness is
fluffy; therefore, something is fluffy’. Because the quantifier ‘some-
thing’ can be treated as either a logical or non-logical term, both a
propositional and a first-order logic can be applied to this argument.
But since they conflict over its validity, contradiction ensues.
Field’s Aim-Relative Pluralism. According to Field (2009a), logics
are correct relative to agents’ epistemic aims. Classical logic might be
correct when one’s aim is to draw true conclusions from a set of
premisses, but if one’s aim is to draw true and relevant conclusions,
then relevant logic is correct. Since ‘it isn’t obvious that there need
be a uniquely best logic for a given goal’ (2009a, p. 356), multiple
conflicting relevant logics might be correct for a single argument if
one’s aim is to draw true and relevant conclusions from its prem-
isses, thereby rendering Field’s pluralism susceptible to the norma-
tive contradiction argument.
IV
Replies and Rejoinders. I now consider five replies on the pluralists’
behalf. A natural response to the normative contradiction argument
is that the contradiction only follows because we have failed to
8 J.W EVERSHED
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disambiguate certain terms which should be indexed to the logics in
question. Replies 1–3 are all in this vein, but differ over which terms
need disambiguating. Reply 4 questions the assumption that all of
the pluralist’s logics are normative, whilst reply 5 challenges the
logic employed by the normative contradiction argument itself.
Reply 1. The pluralist can avoid contradiction by indexing the bridge
principles’ deontic operators to L1 and L2. Accordingly, ðm VBPL1Þ
becomes: If CL1u, then s is L1-permitted to form the belief that u
via deduction from C. And ðIBPL2Þ becomes: If C 6L2 u, then s is
L2-forbidden from forming the belief that u via deduction from C.
But rather than leading to contradiction, all that follows from these
principles via the normative contradiction argument is that s is L
1
-
permitted to deduce u from C but L2-forbidden from doing so.
Rejoinder. Given that other paradoxes and contradictions arising
from conflicting norms cannot be resolved just by distinguishing be-
tween different kinds of oughts, nor can this one. Take the Preface
Paradox. An author rationally believes each sentence in her book,
and so deductive norms require her to believe their conjunction.
Given that an action is not forbidden if it is required of us,9 it follows
via the deductive norm that she is not forbidden from believing the
conjunction. But since she and others like her have made mistakes
before, inductive norms require her to believe the conjunction’s ne-
gation and forbid her from believing the conjunction. Thus the
Preface Paradox involves the following normative contradiction: the
author is both forbidden and not forbidden from believing the con-
junction of all the sentences in her book. Since the Preface Paradox
cannot be satisfactorily resolved merely by distinguishing between
deductive and inductive oughts, and deduction and induction are
more distinct modes of reasoning than deducing in accordance with
different logics, a fortiori, pluralists cannot evade the normative con-
tradiction argument by distinguishing between deductive oughts.10
9 This is the principle of deontic consistency, and is widely accepted in deontic logic and the
literature on whether moral dilemmas entail inconsistency—see Lemmon (1965, p. 51) and
McConnell (2018, §5), respectively.
10 Even if the normative contradiction argument and the Preface Paradox were disanalo-
gous, resolving the former by indexing deontic operators comes at a high cost. Namely, it
leaves reasoners in an irresolvable dilemma whenever the pluralist’s logics conflict. They
will be L1-permitted but L2-forbidden from forming the belief that u via deduction from C,
and given the pluralist’s belief that both logics are equally correct, neither’s prescription can
trump the other’s. As we have already seen, the pluralist’s logics conflict frequently, and so
reasoners will be left in this state of paralysis often, thereby jeopardising the idea that logic
guides our reasoning.
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Reply 2. The methods of belief formation should be logic-indexed,
so that ðm VBPL1Þ becomes: If CL1u, then s is permitted to form
the belief that u via L
1
-deduction from C. ðIBPL2Þ would then read:
If C 6 u, then s is forbidden from forming the belief that u via L2-de-
duction from C. Consequently, all that follows by the normative
contradiction argument’s reasoning is that s is permitted to form the
belief that u via L1-deduction from C but forbidden from doing so
via L2-deduction. Again, no contradiction arises.
Rejoinder. For this reply to work, the pluralist must find a plausi-
ble way of individuating deduction this finely—that is, they must tell
us what L1-deduction is and how it differs from L2-deduction. But,
as we shall now see, the most natural way of doing so leaves the plu-
ralist unable to account for the logical erroneousness of Max’s rea-
soning. Since deduction must be individuated fallibly, Li-deduction
cannot simply be to form a belief via a Li-valid inference. The most
straightforward way to fallibly individuate Li-deduction is according
to the intentions of the reasoner. Roughly, s forms the belief that u
via Li-deduction from C just in case s intends to infer u from C via the
rules of Li-valid deduction. But suppose that Max, like most laypeo-
ple, has neither encountered any of the pluralist’s logics nor been
‘socialised’ into accepting a particular logic. Then, for any Li, Max
forming a belief by affirming the consequent does not qualify as a to-
ken of Li-deduction, because he cannot have the requisite intention
and so his reasoning cannot violate any version of ðIBPLiÞ in which
deduction is logic-indexed. Thus, at least on the most natural way of
individuating Li-deduction, this reply falters, as it has the unaccept-
able consequence that Max’s reasoning is logically unproblematic.
Reply 3. Since different logics give different truth conditions to
logical terms, the meanings of the logical terms in an argument’s
premisses—and thus the meanings of the premisses themselves—dif-
fer between logics. Accordingly, the argument that is L1-valid has
different premisses from the argument that is L2-invalid, and so there
is no contradiction, because s is permitted to and forbidden from de-
ducing u from different sets of premisses, C1 and C2.
Rejoinder. This reply relies on the Quinean ‘Change in Logic,
Change in Meaning’ thesis (clcm) and, as far as it goes, it is correct.
However, even if clcm is true, this reply is limited in scope, and
therefore the normative contradiction argument remains of interest.
First, Beall and Restall (2006, p. 79) and Field (2009a, p. 345) explic-
itly disavow clcm. Beall and Restall, for example, endorse a view on
10 J.W EVERSHED
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which proponents of different logics agree on minimalist truth condi-
tions for logical terms, and thereby agree on their meanings.11 Second,
this move will not help Varzi, since within his pluralism, conflicts over
an argument’s validity may arise because the different logics treat dif-
ferent terms in the argument’s premisses as logical, rather than be-
cause they give these terms different truth conditions. Finally, there
are good reasons to doubt clcm beyond those given by the aforemen-
tioned pluralists. For instance, Williamson (2007, pp. 85–98) argues
that the same considerations which support semantic externalism
militate against clcm because they undermine a claim which it pre-
supposes: that identity of truth conditions is necessary for identity of
meaning. Although proponents of different logics may give a logical
term different truth conditions, in everyday practice their usage of
this term will largely conform to that of the broader linguistic com-
munity. Moreover, both intend their words to have the same mean-
ing as their linguistic community—after all, each believes that their
semantics is correct for the term as used by the wider community,
not just themselves. These two facts together ensure that they are
both part of the same linguistic community and, consequently, that
they use the logical term with the same public meaning.
Reply 4. The normative contradiction argument relies on
ðm–VBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ being true for all of the pluralist’s correct
logics. Accordingly, pluralists can avoid its conclusion by claiming
that ðm–VBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ only hold for some correct logics.
Rejoinder. First, it is unclear why ðm–VBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ would
hold for some correct logics but not others—after all, they are all
equally correct. Second, the normative contradiction argument only
requires ðm–VBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ to hold for more than one of the
pluralist’s correct logics, not them all. For as long as this is so, a nor-
mative contradiction can be derived from these logics’ bridge princi-
ples when they conflict over an argument’s validity. Thus, for this
strategy to succeed, ðm–VBPLiÞ and ðIBPLiÞ must only hold for one
of the pluralist’s correct logics. However, given the intimate connec-
tion between logic and reasoning, the one normative logic would
have a compelling claim to being the one true logic thereby collaps-
ing the pluralist’s position into monism.12
11 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Restall (2002, pp. 437–8).
12 It is worth highlighting that the normative contradiction argument cannot be avoided by
claiming that all correct logics constrain either belief combinations or methods of belief for-
mation, but none constrain both. This is because the argument only needed (m#VBPLi) to
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Reply 5. The normative contradiction argument employs reductio
ad absurdum to move from the contradictory normative claims to the




are not both correct. Accordingly,
pluralists can sidestep this conclusion by claiming that the only correct
metalogics for reasoning about logics are paraconsistent. Since reduc-
tio ad absurdum is invalid in paraconsistent logics, this conclusion
will not follow from the contradictory normative claims.
Rejoinder. This reply is of little help. First, pluralists who are not
dialetheists will be loath to admit that their pluralism entails contra-
dictory normative claims, even if said contradictory claims cannot be
used in a reductio. Second, although reductio ad absurdum is invalid
in paraconsistent logics, it remains truth-preserving provided that
none of its premisses are dialetheias—in Priest’s (2006) terminology,
reductio ad absurdum is quasi-valid. Since there is no reason to think
that any of the normative contradiction argument’s premisses are
dialetheias, if its premisses are true as I have argued, then so too is
its conclusion.
V
Conclusion. We began with the question, ‘What is the relationship be-
tween logical pluralism and the normativity of logic?’ In a bid to help
answer it, this paper has advanced two theses. First, the Double
Thesis that, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs
that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may
form them. Second, the Inconsistency Thesis that many pluralisms are
inconsistent with logic being doubly normative for reasoning, thus
spelling double trouble for these pluralists. This was demonstrated by
the normative contradiction argument, which showed that many plu-
ralisms entail contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason
whenever two of the pluralist’s logics conflict over the validity of an
argument whose conclusion is easily deducible from premisses that
the agent ought to believe. Thus, at the very least, many pluralists
must choose between their pluralisms and the normativity of logic.
hold for logic L1 and (IBPLi) to hold for L2, and at no point required both (m#VBPLi) and
(IBPLi) to hold for both or either of L1 and L2. Of course, one way to ensure that this re-
quirement is met is to argue, as I did in §ii, that both (m#VBPLi) and (IBPLi) hold for both
L1 and L2. However, strictly speaking, this is stronger than necessary.
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And if there are compelling reasons for thinking that logic is doubly
normative, as I have suggested, these pluralists have no choice at all.13
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